That communication pervades the everyday life of organizations is a statement of the obvious.
transformation of streams of signals with its associated time or cognitive costs, and use our results to readily draw conclusions about its overall performance.
I. Communication and forecasts
The underlying state of the world θ is normally distributed with mean zero and variance θ φ . (1. The linearity of the expectation operator readily implies the following:
There is a private signal
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Arbitrary high-order iterated expectations depend both on the number q of such iterations, and on all the possible ordered identities 1 2 , , , q i i i … of the players along the chain of pair-wise inferences entering these iterated expectations (expectations about whom expectations, about whom expectations ...). These high-order beliefs reflect the ability of each player to infer the information held by the other players after communication, and thus depend on the details of the communication process P , and the corresponding correlation in output signals in ε φ Σ P .
In general, we cannot invoke nor construct some average belief operator to compute highorder beliefs, neither expect symmetric behavior from the part of the players. Rather, highorder iterated expectations are an-isotropic, and change with the particular ordered chain of pair-wise inferences. This an-isotropy very likely sustains asymmetric choices across players.
II. Knowledge index and decisions
We now characterize the Bayes-Nash equilibria of the game when players' information is given by the output signals after communication.
Notice that high-order beliefs by player i in ( Let Ω P be a zero diagonal matrix with out-of-diagonal terms ij ω P . Then, the coefficients of the th q power of this matrix are the 
This is a non-negative vector, and each coordinate reaches its upper bound 
Definition. The knowledge index for the communication P is
This is a normalized vector whose coordinates between zero and one give the discounted high-order beliefs of individual players for the current communication process among them. 
III. A class of networked communication processes
So far, the communication process is characterized by the distribution over its output signals.
We now describe a particular instance of a communication process for which we can explicitly compute this distribution over output signals.
Let each player perform separately a different experiment. We get a particular realization of private signals , 1,..., 
At equilibrium, players forecast the value of θ , and 1 i x is a sufficient statistics for that matter.
They also anticipate adequately each others' actions, which involves a forecast of each others' private information, forecasts about forecasts, etc. On top of easing retransmission, reducing the information contained in a stream of signals into a simple average renders these cross forecasts easier to compute. However, this inevitably comes with a loss in information compared to the straight cross forecasts based on the full signal streams.
When players communicate repeatedly with their direct interlocutors in the network g , and average the incoming stream of signals before re-transmitting it back to them, the resulting output signals after t completed rounds of talks are
x . We denote by ( ) t g P this communication process.
A useful analogy with ( ) t g P is the following. Let players pick a message recipient uniformly among all their possible interlocutors in g . We get a random walk on the network, where transmission from to i j occur with probability
More generally, the row-
gives the probabilities of a random walk of length t between every pair and i j. The intersections and partial overlaps across of all the t − random walks emanating from i and j then determine the correlation between the output signals and t t i j x x that these players get after t completed rounds of conversations:
, for all , . Plugging (3.1) into (1.2) gives all the necessary ingredients to compute the Bayes-Nash equilibrium of ( ) t g P for all and g t.
We compare the corresponding equilibrium payoffs for two different network geometries and for various communication rounds. To get a sense of the cost for the installed communication capacity, we compare two networks on 4 n = agents with identical total number of links, the kite and the wheel. However, these payoffs ranking is reversed with enough communication rounds. The reason is the following. A message initially at i is at j at round t with probability When all players share the same beliefs, the knowledge index hits its upper bound of one.
Aggregate long-run payoffs then take the following simple form:
Fix the total supply of links. Then, these payoffs are maximal when Two networks with four links and four players each, the kite and the wheel. 
